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Chapter 9
Private Pensions, Inflation, 
and Employment
James H. Schulz
Some Prefatory Comments 
on Social Security
Attention continues to be riveted on issues and problems 
associated with OASDHI, almost as if the other parts of our 
system to provide financial security during old age were free 
of troubles. The list of fears and criticisms is now well 
known: Social Security is going bankrupt; we "can't afford" 
the cost of future benefits; Social Security depresses savings 
and hence economic growth; various provisions of the in 
surance programs are inequitable and discourage work; and 
at a time when we are trying to balance the budget and 
reduce the size of the federal government, Social Security 
continues to grow at an uncontrolled pace.
All these criticisms are debatable, of course. In fact, the 
arguments continue hot and heavy both in the policymak- 
ing arena and in academia. As a strong supporter of Social 
Security, I only point out here that while public anx 
iety fueled by political rhetoric has reached un 
precedented levels, public support for Social Security re 
mains high; people want Social Security made secure not 
dismembered even if that requires higher taxes. l Moreover, 
every bipartisan government commission appointed to 
review the system has emphasized the viability of the 




Of course, most critics of Social Security today also pro 
fess to support the system. They argue, however, that major 
long-term changes are needed. Their proposed changes are 
almost all pointed in one direction drastic cutbacks in 
benefits to reduce program costs. The logical question that 
follows from proposed action of that kind is: what else 
changes in reaction to cutbacks in Social Security (i.e., what 
takes the place of Social Security)?
In examining the ability of alternatives to pick up the slack 
from a pared down Social Security program, we should not 
ignore economic history. Despite what Martha Derthick says 
about bureaucratic elites engineering the expansion of Social 
Security, the development of OASDHI was to a very large 
extent a reaction to the failure of the alternatives namely 
employment of the old and providing for old age through 
personal savings. 2 The vicissitudes of our economic system 
over the years have made both these alternatives largely 
untenable:
a) Past periods of unemployment and inflation have made 
financial planning and preparation for retirement ex 
tremely difficult for individuals, if not impossible. 3
b)An inability to achieve sustained full employment ex 
cept in periods when the nation was preparing, fighting, 
or recovering from war, 4 has caused the government to 
actively discourage employment by older workers and to 
develop pension mechanisms that encourage retirement.
c) Finally, both Social Security and private pensions also 
have a long history as tools of business management to 
deal with cyclical and long-term shifts in demand. 5
What then are the alternatives proposed today? Not sur 
prisingly, we find that they are the same as in the past; 
private saving, private insurance and employment of the old. 
The focus of this conference is on employment, and my 
assignment is to relate private pensions to it. I shall restrict
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myself, therefore, to the relationship between pensions and 
employment opportunities.
But one must begin by recognizing that there is some large 
measure of unreality in talking about employment as an 
alternative to Social Security especially at a time when 
unemployment is at double-digit levels. Many economists in 
sist that policy development should focus on the labor force 
disincentives created by various aging programs, especially 
Social Security, implicitly assuming that a full-employment 
economy was, is, and will be the reality. Worse yet, some 
analysts confuse the issues in a major way by failing to 
distinguish between theory and assumption on the one hand 
and the realities of the American market-oriented economy 
on the other. For example, a recent analysis by the Congres 
sional Budget Office states:
Increasing numbers of nonworking older persons 
could reduce the amount of goods and services pro 
duced in the economy as well as personal incomes. 
This decreased production could also put upward 
pressure on prices and increase inflation. The 
smaller labor force of older workers probably 
would reduce overall unemployment, however, 
because many jobs not taken by older persons 
would go to younger ones. 6
Of course, other things being equal, withdrawal of any 
substantial number of persons from the labor force will 
reduce potential national output. But as has been emphasiz 
ed above, we have all too frequently failed to achieve our 
potential. Perhaps we should develop better policies to 
achieve sustained economic growth before agonizing about 
the problems the elderly may create if we are successful in 
meeting that goal.
We know with great certainty that demographic trends will 
lead to a decrease in the ratio between the population of
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traditional working age and the older population (but not 
necessarily to dependent population of young and old com 
bined). What we do not know is whether we will be able to 
do any better in the future than we have in the past in 
employing the potential labor force. Yet full employment is 
seen by many as the simple and obvious solution to most of 
Social Security's current and future problems.
Even if it is assumed that we will be able to generate suffi 
cient jobs for all age groups in the future, including more 
jobs for the aged we need to confront two other major 
issues: the fact that the elderly strongly prefer retirement to 
full-time work and the fact that increased longevity does not 
necessarily mean more surviving older persons will be able to 
work. With regard to the former, voluminous data7 now in 
dicate quite clearly that workers have a high degree of 
preference for retirement over continued employment even 
when pension benefits are relatively low. 8 The data are much 
less clear with regard to the implications of increased 
longevity, but certainly available statistics do not indicate 
any marked turn-around in ability to work in the later years. 
Rather than the expected decrease in the proportion of men 
age 50-69 unable to work because of illness, data from the 
National Health Interview Survey show that the proportion 
actually increased between 1970 and 1980. 9
There are still many health factors at work that reduce 
mortality but also reduce the employability of older persons. 
Examples include: improved survival for myocardial infarc 
tion among the disabled; the persistence of the incidence of 
arthritis or any of a number of other disabling conditions 
that do not generally cause death; the successful treatment of 
individuals with problems such as diabetes that previously 
caused early deaths but that are still disabling, and alcohol or 
drug abuse.
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Robert N. Butler, former director of the National Institute 
on Aging, recently summarized the issue as follows:
It is not clear that morbidity rates in the older 
population are improving. While mortality from 
heart disease and stroke has gone down, the data 
do not clarify whether this means disease has been 
prevented and people are not at risk, or whether 
more people are surviving with impairments, 
thanks to medical and other support. A number of 
leading demographers and epidemiologists share 
the view that morbidity in later life probably is ris 
ing. One recent paper (by L. A. Colvez10) indicates 
that morbidity and attending disability increased 
rapidly from 1966 to 1976. The increases were 
sharpest for those aged 45 to 64. u
Benefit Levels in Private Pensions
Putting aside the issue of the extent to which we can and 
should rely on public versus private mechanisms for income 
in old age, what is the impact of private pensions on employ 
ment in the later years? It is now commonplace for analysts 
to cite the dramatic drop in labor force participation rates 
among older persons and to point a suspicious finger at 
public and private pensions, especially the liberalization of 
coverage and benefit levels that has occurred over recent 
decades. Gordus for example, writes:
In 1870, about 20 percent of the males 65 years of 
age and over were retired. In 1970, nearly 75 per 
cent of the male population over 65 had withdrawn 
from the labor force. This trend toward retirement 
reflects a demographic shift, a rising average age at 
death. The incomes of retired Americans are now 
maintained through benefits from private pension 
plans and from social security benefits. For over a
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century, demographic change and the gradual 
development of pension benefits have combined to 
produce a relatively new phenomenon, retirement. 
More recently, the extension of pension benefits to 
those younger than 65, in combination with other 
factors, has produced an even newer phenomenon, 
early retirement. 12
While pension developments have undoubtedly had an im 
portant impact on labor force behavior and decisions to 
retire, any precise quantification of the impact or a com 
pletely satisfactory explanation of "the retirement decision" 
has yet to be achieved. The four excellent reviews of our 
knowledge in this area by Mitchell/Fields, Foner/Schwab, 
Morgan, and Clark/Barker indicate the complexities of the 
issues and the limitations of research done thus far. 13
With regard to private pensions, the literature discusses a 
variety of factors that may encourage employees to retire 
earlier. Mandatory retirement provisions are still very com 
mon in companies with private pensions. Private disability 
benefits are usually a part of private plans, complementing 
disability coverage from other programs. Benefits are usual 
ly paid only if an employee stops work and separates from 
the company. Pension benefit accruals, especially given the 
tax treatment of pension reserves, typically represent a 
sizeable accumulation of personal wealth wealth available 
for consumption needs, however, only in the latter part of 
the life cycle. Finally, private plan formulas and payment 
provisions are often structured in ways that discourage con 
tinued employment.
Based on the most recent studies, there seem to be relative 
ly strong indications that higher private pension benefit 
levels do in fact encourage retirement. This raises the ques 
tion of what the level of private benefits is and the extent to 
which they have been changing over time.
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We have just completed a study of these two questions at 
the Brandeis Policy Center on Aging. 14 The major purpose 
of this study was to analyze the 1979 benefit levels both 
retirement and survivor benefits in a representative sample 
of private pension plans. Pension benefits were calculated 
for hypothetical workers retiring in 1979, using U.S. Bureau 
of Labor Statistics (BLS) data on 1,010 pension plans cover 
ing workers in establishments meeting certain minimum 
employment size criteria (50 to 250 workers, depending on 
industry).
Median pension replacement rates were estimated 
separately for male and female workers in various industries, 
by years of service. Distributions of replacement rates were 
also presented by sex and years of service. Total replacement 
rates were calculated by combining Social Security and 
private pension benefits. Using replacement rate targets 
necessary to maintain living standards in retirement for men 
whose earnings had been equal to the median wage, 
estimates were made of the proportion of such workers 
where pension benefits (together with Social Security) would 
achieve those targets.
Results of the 1979 survey analysis were compared with a 
prior BLS survey of 1,467 defined benefit plans in 1974. 
Because the 1979 survey did not include many of the large 
multiemployer plans, the comparison was restricted to single 
employer plans in 1974.
The median private pension replacement rate in the 1979 
plans, for workers with 30 years of service and average earn 
ings, was 27 percent for males and 34 percent for females. 
Median replacement rates varied from a low of 23 percent in 
the service industry to a high of 35 percent for females in 
manufacturing. Comparison of the 1979 and 1974 data sug 
gests that a small improvement in plan benefit levels had oc 
curred over the five-year period between surveys.
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The total replacement rate (Social Security plus private 
pension) for a hypothetical male worker with 30 years service 
was compared for each plan with the "target replacement 
rate" necessary to maintain living standards in retirement 
without other income supplementation. Very few workers, 6 
percent, were in plans that achieved that target in 1979. But 
if the spouse benefit under Social Security was included 
(e.g., the case of a married male worker with a nonworking 
wife), the proportion in plans achieving the target replace 
ment rate rose dramatically to 59 percent.
Probably the most important limitation of the study is the 
fact that benefit level estimates were made assuming long 
and uninterrupted work histories of 20 and 30 years. In reali 
ty, many workers shift jobs frequently. And even if they ac 
quire vested benefits before leaving a job, two or three vested 
pensions will rarely produce a combined benefit as large as 
one based on 20 or 30 years of continuous employment. 
Thus, the hypothetical calculations in the study should not 
be used to predict the adequacy of pensions for actual 
workers. Instead, they can be used to indicate the potential 
contribution of private plans to retirement income and to 
show the wide variation in benefit levels that occurs among 
plans.
If we keep in mind the long tenure assumption, the 
replacement rates calculated in the Brandeis study do give a 
good indication of the potential magnitude of private pen 
sions as part of total pension income. Table 1 shows the me 
dian of the replacement rates provided by the 1979 plans in 
various industries and also estimated Social Security replace 
ment rates. Earnings levels used in calculating the replace 
ment rate for hypothetical workers were based on tabula 
tions of data from the Social Security Administration's 




1979 Median Replacement Rates for Hypothetical 

























































SOURCE: Based on data in James H. Schulz et al., Private Pension Benefits in the 
1970s—A Study of Retirement and Survivor Benefit Levels in 1974 and 1979 (Bryn Mawr, 
PA: McCahan Foundation, 1982).
a. The mining and construction industries are omitted because of small sample size, 
b. Based on BLS, Level of Benefits Survey, a representative sample of U.S. establishments 
(excluding Alaska and Hawaii) with a minimum size of SO to 200, depending on industry. 
Because this survey samples establishments rather than plans, inference is appropriate only 
to those establishments meeting the BLS size criteria and to the pension plans found in such 
establishments. Thus, the survey cannot be used as a guide to benefit levels (a) in very small 
establishments or (b) in those large plans (particularly multiemployer plans) covering many 
small establishments.
c. Calculated using the legislated benefit formula and rules appropriate for 1979. Benefits 
were calculated assuming that the worker was employed in Social Security covered employ 
ment during the years without private pension coverage, if any. Spouse benefits are not in 
cluded.
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In three of the five industries studied, the private pension 
replacement rate of a long-term, "average" male worker 
equaled or exceeded the Social Security replacement in 
dicating the major role that private pensions can play in the 
total pension income of some workers. For women, the role 
is smaller; Social Security replacement rates for women 
always exceeded the private ones. This is a result of the lower 
earnings levels of women and the weighted Social Security 
formula favoring low earners.
To the extent that the size of pensions is related to the 
retirement decision, the data indicate that private plans 
probably play a major role. However, the factor of inflation 
complicates any assessment of impact. Unlike Social Securi 
ty, which is fully indexed, hardly any private plans 
automatically adjust benefits in payment status for inflation. 
Such adjustment that does take place is typically done on an 
ad hoc basis and rarely comes close to keeping up with the 
CPI. We would like to know the extent to which the failure 
of private pensions to adjust for inflation affects the employ 
ment decisions of older workers.
Inflation and the Elderly
Older persons living on fixed incomes used to be one of the 
most inflation-vulnerable groups in our society. Times have 
changed, however. Today, elderly persons have important 
protections against inflation:
  Social Security, federal supplemental security income 
(SSI) benefits, federal pensions, and food stamps are all 
indexed fully against inflation.
  Medicare and Medicaid benefits help to keep pace with 
medical costs that rise in part due to inflation.
  Most of the assets of the elderly are held in the form of 
real estate the value of which has risen in most cases 
faster than inflation.
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  The rising Social Security benefits of the elderly are not 
subject to federal income tax and hence not subject to 
erosion as a result of progressive tax brackets defined in 
money rather than real terms. 16
There are two major sources of elderly income, however, 
that are still highly vulnerable to inflation: financial assets 
and private pensions. Most financial assets bonds, check 
ing accounts, savings accounts, and insurance policies do 
not adjust when the general level of prices changes. Common 
stocks and mutual funds may promise better protection over 
the long run, but no guarantee of complete security from in 
flation over any particular short run period. As indicated 
above, almost all private pension plan commitments during 
retirement are specified in money terms, with no guarantee 
of any adjustment for inflation.
The possibility of continuing high levels of inflation in the 
years to come requires that we think seriously of providing 
appropriate safeguards for the most economically vulnerable 
age group of our population. The most serious problem of 
this kind at the present is the vulnerability of the 
"near-poor" aged. An overwhelming majority of elderly live 
on incomes above the official poverty level, but below 
$10,000 a year. Many of these elderly families depend on 
their financial savings and their private pensions to provide 
the margin of support necessary for a modest but more com 
fortable life style.
Rising government expenditures caused by automatically 
indexed Social Security benefits have resulted in increased 
scrutiny of the adjustment mechanism and of the ap 
propriateness of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) for making 
such adjustments. During inflationary periods, the prices of 
various goods change by different amounts. Since the expen 
diture patterns of individuals and families differ, the impact 
of any particular pattern of price increases will vary, depend-
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ing on the expenditure patterns of various individuals. 17 For 
example, if food and housing prices go up faster than the 
prices of other goods and services and if the aged spend a 
large share of their income on food and housing, the result is 
a larger increase in prices paid by the aged than the non- 
aged.
Thus there is a concern that the CPI, which is the measure 
used to adjust Social Security benefits, does not correctly 
reflect the buying patterns of the aged. Some organizations 
that speak for the aged argue that the CPI underestimates 
the impact of inflation on the elderly and advocate a special 
index for the elderly. More recently, others have argued that 
Social Security increases based on the CPI are too generous.
How well the CPI measures changes in living costs of the 
elderly depends on: what prices are rising or falling; how 
rapidly particular prices are changing; and the reactions (i.e., 
changing expenditure patterns) of particular groups of the 
elderly. All the studies of these issues suggest that using 
special price indexes for subgroups of the population like the 
aged will not necessarily be more equitable than using the 
regular CPI. 18 Thus, the present indexed Social Security 
system seems to do a relatively good job of reducing the 
uncertainty and anxiety facing older persons in periods of 
rapid inflation.
Instead of a new index for the aged, we need to improve 
the existing CPI. The recent BLS change in handling housing 
costs is a step in the right direction, but a more general prob 
lem exists. There is a systematic, upward bias in the CPI, 
primarily due to the lag in accounting for new products and 
for quality improvement in products and services. With 
regard to quality change, the CPI does not measure the im 
pact of changes in product performance. For example, the 
prices of motor oil, tires, light bulbs, appliances, etc. have 
increased. But because the service life of many such products
253
has also increased, not all the price increases are truly infla 
tionary.
Economists have written about these problems for many 
years. Over 20 years ago a prestigious committee headed by 
economist George Stigler recommended major changes in 
the CPI. Unfortunately little has been done since then. With 
the amount of indexing that now takes place, it is imperative 
that we reassess the situation. I would like to see a major 
review of ways to moderate the existing bias in the CPI. By 
doing this, the costs of pension indexing could be reduced 
without hurting the living standards of pensioners.
As has been mentioned, while the impact of inflation on 
the elderly has been reduced, the two major remaining prob 
lems are the erosion of savings and the fact that private pen 
sions do not fully adjust for price rises during retirement. 
The latter problem has received increasing attention in recent 
years, and consideration is being given to the ways that plans 
can be redesigned to reduce it. 19 However, a related problem 
has been largely ignored. 20 Most vested benefits are frozen 
when a worker changes jobs. The worker does not benefit 
from subsequent improvements in the plan formula or even 
the inflation protection of many plans that base benefits on 
average earnings just prior to retirement. For example, given 
the inflation rates of the post-war period, a vested pension 
for someone changing jobs at age 45 (with, say 20 years of 
coverage) will give a worker almost nothing at retirement.
Why is so little attention given to this vesting problem? In 
part, it is because private pensions are so new. Many people 
affected by the problem (i.e., vested workers) are still many 
years from retirement. Yet, given the serious implications of 
the vesting-inflation issue for the future, the problem needs 
to be addressed. Perhaps an even more important reason 
that the issue has been ignored is cost. Employers with defin 
ed benefit plans currently keep their pension costs down by
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giving little or no benefits to workers who leave the firms' 
employ in their early years. To deal with this problem effec 
tively would require a major increase in pension expenditures 
by employers.
The Impact of Inflation 
on Retirement Decisions
Given the recent high rates of inflation and the fact that 
private pensions do not keep up with inflation, many 
observers have supposed that current workers will be reluc 
tant to retire as early as recent cohorts of retirees. For exam 
ple, Sheppard recently speculated that "there might be a new 
retirement consciousness developing in this country, which is 
making older workers reexamine the costs of retiring 
prematurely." 21
While longitudinal data bearing on this question are 
relatively sparse, most of the available evidence indicates 
that retirements have slowed somewhat in recent years, but 
not in any appreciable way. An analysis by Parnes of the Na 
tional Longitudinal Survey (NLS) data found that "the trend 
toward earlier retirement that had been discernible in the 
longitudinal data between 1966 and 1976 continued without 
interruption between 1976 and 1978." 22 Parnes also found 
among retired men only slightly more interest in post- 
retirement jobs in 1978 than in 1976. (Parnes is currently 
analyzing data from a more recent NLS survey and will soon 
have additional information on this question.)
The Panel Study of Income Dynamics also provides 
longitudinal data bearing on the impact of inflation on 
retirement decisions. In 1979, the panel was asked whether 
inflation had caused them to change their attitudes toward 
retirement. According to Morgan, "the startling finding 
from the responses was the small effect of inflation." 23 The 
actions or plans of those already retired had changed hardly
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at all. With regard to those age 45 or older who were not yet 
retired, however, there was a small but significant change in 
plans or expectations regarding retirement. About a fifth of 
the interviewees in that group indicated they would not be 
retiring as early as previously planned.
One of the most useful indicators of retirement trends is 
Social Security data on new benefit awards. Table 2 shows 
the number of Social Security benefits newly awarded and 
the proportion of these beneficiaries receiving reduced 
benefits for retirement before age 65. From 1973 to 1978 the 
trend was clearly in the direction of more early retirement. 
Since then the data indicate a relatively sharp drop in the 
proportion of men awarded benefits before age 65, but a 
very small decline for women.
What available evidence we have, therefore, indicates that 
the inflation of recent years may have moderated the rush to 
early retirement that developed in the 1960s and 1970s. The 
proportion of people retiring early, however, still remains 
very high, and we should not be surprised if the trend 
resumes its upward climb once inflation moderates.
Pension Retirement Incentives
While inflation's impact on benefit levels may be reducing 
the number of workers currently retiring at early ages, it is 
important to be aware of a number of factors in the design of 
private pension plans (in addition to benefit levels) that en 
courage retirement. It is clear that it is relatively easy to en 
courage workers in a broad spectrum of occupations and in 
dustries to retire at early ages through various pension incen 
tive mechanisms. Probably the most important way to en 
courage early retirement is by simply making pensions 
available at early ages. Data on defined benefit plans cover 
ing about 23 million workers in 1974 show that 70 percent of 
these workers were eligible for early retirement benefits at
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least by age 60 (provided service requirements, if any, were 
met). 24 Over half could retire as early as age 55, and 15 per 
cent were in plans with even earlier eligibility ages (or no age 
requirement at all).
Table 2 
New Social Security Worker Beneficiaries
and the Proportion Receiving 















































































SOURCE: Table Q-6, published quarterly in the Social Security Bulletin (Washington, DC:
U.S. Government Printing Office).
a. Reduced benefits awards currently payable as a percent of all awards moving to payment
status (currently payable regular awards plus those originally awarded as not currently
payable that moved to payment status).
b. Data are not available.
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A Bureau of Labor Statistics analysis of a sample of 
private plans in 1978 indicates that retirement age policies 
have been significantly liberalized since 1974. "In 1978, ap 
proximately three out of four plans allowed retirement at age 
55 or earlier, as compared with two out of three in 1974." 25 
Moreover, many plans have lowered their normal retirement 
age (i.e., the age at which unreduced benefits are paid) below 
age 65, and other have eliminated age requirements entirely.
These numbers do not tell the whole story, however. When 
a worker retires before the "normal" retirement age, his or 
her benefit is usually reduced. But a large number of 
employers encourage their employees to retire early by ab 
sorbing some of the costs of paying pensions over a longer 
period of time. While some plans reduce benefits by the full 
actuarial discount, many plans, in effect, give actuarial 
bonuses to workers who retire early. Our study of defined 
benefit plans in 1974 indicates that powerful economic incen 
tives are provided in many plans. For example, in 1974 there 
were about seven million workers covered by defined benefit 
plans that permitted retirement at age 60 with less than a full 
actuarial reduction in benefits. More recently The Urban In 
stitute has tabulated early retirement reductions using the 
1979 Bureau of Labor Statistics Level of Benefits Survey. 
They found that 78 percent of participants in plans with ear 
ly retirement provisions were subject to less than full ac 
tuarial reductions in benefits. 26
In addition to encouraging retirement through regular 
retirement plans, many corporations have developed special 
and more limited benefit "offers" to encourage their 
employees to retire. A recent report on special incentive pro 
grams by Towers, Perrin, Foster and Crosby (TPFC) looks 
at the evolution of these mechanisms. 27 As pension con 
sultants to major corporations, TPFC state at the beginning 
of their report: "Early retirement benefits are not always 
enough to make retirement affordable and attractive,
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especially during periods of high inflation and economic 
uncertainty. Yet these are precisely the times when com 
panies may need to encourage early retirement on a selective 
basis."
As part of its report, TPFC discusses the special programs 
that have been instituted in ten major corporations. The 
average acceptance rate among those employees offered the 
special plans was 48 percent. In six out of the ten companies, 
moreover, over half the eligible employees took advantage of 
the inducements to retire early, with the acceptance rate go 
ing as high as 73 percent in one company and 67 percent in 
another.
Employment Policies and Older Workers
Even while employers struggle to allocate jobs equitably 
and efficiently in an economic environment of shrinking and 
shifting demand, we have been shocked by people proposing 
what was once thought to be unthinkable. It is now frequent 
ly recommended that the normal retirement age for Social 
Security be raised and/or that early retirement under Social 
Security be heavily penalized. Such proposals are stimulated 
in large part by rising pension costs and declining labor force 
participation among older workers.
Currently there is high unemployment and no general 
shortage of labor. But as the age structure of the population 
shifts, employers may be faced with an entirely different 
situation. Unlike the past when both employers and unions 
encouraged workers to retire at increasingly early 
ages employers of the future may want older workers to 
stay longer. But will employee attitudes also change? Most 
older workers want to retire as soon as possible; once retired, 
they adjust well to their new status in society and enjoy their 
increased leisure.
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Any proposal to mandate a longer period of work life in 
the later years is likely to meet strong resistance from 
American workers, especially older workers. Pension plans 
were developed to provide compensation based on years of 
service on the job rather than on need per se. Thus, as 
observed by Friedman and Orbach in their excellent survey 
of retirement research, pensions have emerged "as an * earn 
ed right' and (have) become instrumental in defining retire 
ment status as appropriate for the older workers." 28 It will 
be difficult to turn back the clock and convince future 
generations of workers that they are required to postpone 
their enjoyment of the retirement period currently enjoyed 
by so many older Americans.
There are two basic approaches to getting workers to re 
main in the labor force the carrot and the stick. Which is 
better? Which should be emphasized? Should we achieve 
higher labor force participation on the part of older workers 
by severe penalties or by mandating work (compulsion), or 
should we emphasize incentives that will increase voluntary 
participation?
I think we should emphasize the carrot approach. Along 
these lines, there are many things we can do. For example, 
we must get management and workers to speed up the 
development of more flexible work opportunities and en 
courage a more positive attitude toward older workers. That 
is hard to do in an environment of high unemployment. I 
would recommend 
  that there be more research and demonstrations to help 
employers understand the feasibility and profitability of 
flexibility in work environments;
  that mandatory retirement be completely abolished 
(more for attitudinal and symbolic reasons than for its 
labor force impact, which would be negligible);
  that the Social Security retirement test be significantly 
liberalized.
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The last of these recommendations deserves elaboration. 
The retirement test is currently $6,000 for persons age 65 to 
71 and $4,400 for those age 62 to 64. For many years I have 
urged major liberalization of the test, rather than abolition. 
In an opening address to "Committee One" 29 of the 1981 
White House Conference on Aging, I recommended that the 
test be set at the level of "average wages covered under 
Social Security." In 1981 that would have been about 
$13,000. At this level, benefits would go mostly to those in 
need and those with modest incomes, i.e., the cost would be 
much, much less than if the earnings test were completely 
abolished. For example, if the test were set at $10,000 in 
1983, only about $900 million would have to be paid out in 
additional benefits. 30 In contrast, complete abolition of the 
test at all ages would cost about eight billion dollars and, fur 
thermore, would distribute the benefits in a very inequitable 
way. A simulation study on abolishing the retirement test 
that I carried out revealed that half of the new benefits from 
abolition of the test would have gone to the top one-third of 
aged income recipients, with incomes over $10,000. 31 Twenty 
percent would have gone to those with incomes over 
$20,000!
The White House Conference Committee, after consider 
ing both a liberalized retirement test and abolishment of the 
test, formally adopted my proposal as a recommendation. 
Unfortunately, the present Administration took the recom 
mendations of all the Committees and selected only a few 
that were generally consistent with their ideological predilec 
tions. These selected recommendations wre the only ones put 
into the primary conference report ("A National Policy on 
Aging"), and included a recommendation from another 
committee that supported abolition of the earnings test. 
Thus, the recommendation for a liberalized retirement test 
was eliminated in this manipulative process. But the fact re 
mains that the majority of a cross-section of Americans who
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were delegates to the conference chose liberalization of the 
retirement test over its complete abolition when presented 
with a choice between the two.
Conclusion
We are entering into a new era of pension policy. The early 
years entered around, first, gaining acceptance of the idea of 
collective retirement income and, second, the actual im 
plementation of both public and private pension plans. Now 
that these pension programs have been in operation for 
many years, attention has shifted to assessing how well they 
operate and projecting what they will cost. Issues of pension 
adequacy, pension equity, and pension burdens have moved 
to center stage.
During the past two decades we have witnessed a tremen 
dous push toward early retirement. Social Security early 
retirement benefits now go to the majority of new retirees. 
Federal employees can retire on full benefits at age 55 with 
30 years of service; in fact, the President's Commission on 
Pension Policy recently reported that 59 percent of retiring 
male civil servants (fiscal 1978) were age 60 or younger. Most 
state and local government employee plans also have very 
liberal retirement provisions. Early retirement is usually 
possible after 20 to 30 years of service often as early as age 
50 or 55.
While Social Security and public employee pensions are 
important, what I have tried to do in this paper is to em 
phasize the equally important role played by private pen 
sions not just in providing benefits for retirement, but in 
influencing employment/retirement decisions. Today private 
pensions play a key role and, as a consequence, they deserve 
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Chapters 8 & 9 
Discussion
Bert Seidman
When I discuss papers at meetings I usually find myself in 
the position of disagreeing fundamentally with the authors, 
but that is not true on this occasion. I have seldom had the 
opportunity to comment on two papers that offer so much 
sense and sensitivity, especially when so much nonsense and 
insensitivity are abroad about the issues that these papers 
treat.
A formulation that James Schulz used in his paper seems 
particularly appropriate. These papers do, indeed, 
distinguish between theory and assumption on the one hand 
and the realities of the American market-oriented economy 
on the other. I think it is very important that we do not get 
bogged down in theories and that we look at the realities.
Let me begin with Alicia MunnelFs paper. I am in basic 
agreement with her overview of the Social Security system. 
In particular, I agree with the separation of the fiscal 
outlook of Social Security into three separate periods the 
period up until 1990, the period from 1990 to about 2015, or 
perhaps more appropriately until 2025, and then the period 
after that. I will not repeat her analysis, but I believe that it 
correctly portrays the nature and extent of the fiscal prob 
lems that Social Security faces during each of the three 
periods as well as for the entire period until about 2060.1 do 
not want to emphasize that, contrary to the allegations of 
some who are for drastic cuts in Social Security protection, 
those of us who oppose such cuts are not refusing to face up 
to the fiscal problems that Social Security faces. We who op-
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pose Social Security cutbacks fully recognize that there is an 
immediate short term problem which must not be ignored. 
Indeed, it must be dealt with no later than the early months 
of next year, because if we do nothing at all it may not be 
possible to pay full benefits on time as early as 1984. But as 
Munnell has made crystal clear, there are readily available 
ways of meeting this short term problem that do not curtail 
benefits. Some of them are probably more politically feasible 
than others; but let me indicate what some of them are.
In the first place, it is possible to move up to 1984 the in 
creases in the tax rate that are scheduled to take effect be 
tween now and 1990. Are people willing to pay increased 
taxes for Social Security? The answer is already "yes"; poll 
after poll has shown that although people's confidence in 
Social Security has been shaken by scare headlines, they are 
nevertheless quite willing, if necessary, to pay more in order 
to assure the solvency of the system and to guarantee that the 
protection they rightly expect will be available to them. If the 
scheduled increases in payroll taxes were moved up to 1984, 
it would be possible to credit part of the Social Security tax 
for income tax purposes. To make sure that poor people who 
pay little or no income tax are not adversely affected, there 
could be a refundable feature similar to the earned income 
tax credit in current law. This proposal has actually been 
made by a conservative organization, the Committee for 
Economic Development, which is made up exclusively of 
business organizations.
Another possibility would be to eliminate the deductibility 
for income tax purposes of the employer's share of the 
payroll tax and earmark the funds for Social Security. My 
own feeling is that this is probably less feasible politically, 
and probably less desirable. However, if either of those pro 
posals were to be adopted, we could be reasonably sure that 
the Social Security trust funds would be adequate until 1990.
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But to provide absolute assurance, there should be authority 
for the Social Security trust funds to borrow, if necessary, 
from the general fund. This would make it possible to get 
along with trust funds at lower levels than if we had to de 
pend entirely on them for benefit payments even under the 
most adverse circumstances conceivable. Afer 1990, the 
fiscal outlook for Social Security improves greatly. A surplus 
begins to develop rapidly, and it would then be possible to 
repay to the general fund whatever loans may have been 
made to the Social Security trust funds.
With respect to the long term outlook, there are many im 
ponderables. All we know is that we will have more elderly 
and fewer young people than we do now. But what we do not 
know is how many people will be employed or unemployed, 
the levels of wages and prices, the level of immigration and a 
host of other factors that could influence the fiscal outlook 
for Social Security after the first quarter of the next century.
Some of these factors have rarely been taken into con 
sideration in discussions of Social Security's long term 
outlook. For example, the fact that wages are taxed for 
Social Security purposes but fringe benefits are not means 
that how much the system collects in payroll taxes depends 
markedly upon the proportions of total compensation 
represented by wages and by fringe benefits, respectively. 
The assumptions one makes about this issue can have a very 
considerable impact on the long term fiscal outlook of Social 
Security. The actuaries in the Social Security Administration 
have been assuming that fringe benefits as a proportion of 
total compensation will continue to rise indefinitely in the 
future at the same rate as they have in the past. I think that is 
highly unlikely; the dependence of workers on their money 
wages for daily living requirements will put a limit on how 
much of their compensation they will be willing to take in the 
form of fringe benefits.
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Munnell makes a point in her paper that deserves addi 
tional emphasis. It is true that in the future we will have 
more older people in relation to those still in the labor force. 
However, if you consider what is called the total "depen 
dent" population a term that I do not particularly 
like including both persons 65 years of age or over and 
children under the age of 18, the ratio to active workers 40 or 
50 years from now will be lower than it has been in recent 
years. I see no reason why we will not at that time be able to 
transfer to the elderly resources which had previously gone 
to meet the needs of (larger numbers of) young people. In 
deed, the strong political force that will be created by the 
large number of older persons at that time will almost 
guarantee that the necessary reallocation of resources will be 
accomplished.
Now I wish to say a word about James Schulz's paper. He 
and others in this conference have rightly emphasized that 
changes in policies and programs should not be made on the 
assumption that there will be ample and suitable employ 
ment opportunities for the elderly; in other words, that we 
should not put the cart before the horse. We should not 
legislate cutbacks in Social Security protection now, either 
for the near term or the long term, because of unknown fac 
tors that may or may not occur in the distant future.
This admonition is especially relevant to the proposals for 
raising the retirement age for Social Security eligibility. This 
is an issue on which Munnell and Schulz seem to disagree. It 
is my understanding that Munnell sees some merit in a deci 
sion now to gradually raise the retirement age to 68 as a way 
of reducing the long term program costs. In his paper, 
Schulz points to all the problems and hardships that this 
would cause, and advocates use of the carrot rather than the 
stick in order to avoid these difficulties. That is, he would 
emphasize incentive mechanisms that would increase volun 
tary participation in the labor force but not penalize those
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who either because of bad health or lack of suitable employ 
ment opportunities or both and it is the combination of the 
two that afflicts many older people would be unable to 
work. We are not sure of employment opportunities for the 
aged or of decreasing morbidity rates. (Robert Butler, until 
recently Director of the National Institute on Aging, has 
pointed out that morbidity rates may not be improving even 
though people are living longer. 1 ) We certainly should not. 
therefore, commit ourselves now to raising the retirement 
age in the future.
It is ironic that nobody is proposing to prohibit paying full 
private pensions to early retirees. As a matter of fact, we in 
the labor movement would oppose such a prohibition. 
However, if the retirement age under Social Security is rais 
ed, we would be faced with the paradox that the more fully 
protected workers who have both pensions and Social 
Security would have to wait even longer than they now do to 
get their Social Security benefits.
Neither paper takes account of the special needs of the 
"old-old" people over the age of, say, 75. With increasing 
longevity, especially for women, and with no assurance that 
improved health will accompany longer life we will have a 
much larger and growing group of the very old with greater 
needs for income and services. This could require increasing 
expenditures if the old-old are to be adequately provided for, 
and could mean that we would have to allocate to our Social 
Security program as high a proportion of our total income as 
many of the European countries have done for a long time. 
But with a higher level of real national income that will 
prevail when the problem becomes acute, there is no reason 
to assume that this could not be done while still permitting 
active workers and their families to enjoy a level of living 
considerably higher than that enjoyed by today's employed.
1. Statement before the National Commission on Social Security Reform, June 21, 1982.

Chapters 8 & 9 
Discussion
James R. Swenson
Alicia Munnell and James Schulz are to be congratulated 
for their excellent, comprehensive papers. I wish to expand 
on several points made in those papers and discuss several of 
the authors' assertions.
The Munnell paper credibly describes the short and long 
term financing problems confronting the wage replacement 
portion of the Social Security program, namely the OASDI 
benefits. The short term problems, which have been caused 
by adverse economic conditions, were described by Senator 
Heinz as "critical but manageable." That is a reasonable 
characterization and is supported by information provided 
in the paper.
The long term problems are much more significant, par 
ticularly when the Medicare program is considered. The 
Munnell paper only makes a brief reference to the Medicare 
program. Since the Medicare program is of critical impor 
tance to both the financial and physical well-being of most 
Social Security beneficiaries, it should be considered within 
the context of the resources to be transferred from current 
workers to those beneficiaries.
In addition to the short and long term financing problems, 
the Social Security program is faced with a severe lack of 
public confidence. Headline stories about imminent 
bankruptcy have helped to create this reaction. Young 
workers are concerned that there will be no program when 
they reach retirement age. A survey conducted in 1979 found 
that three of every four persons between the ages of 25 and
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44 had little or no confidence that funds will be available to 
pay their retirement benefits. 1 Faced with uncertainty, many 
of the elderly are terrified. They are afraid their benefits will 
be drastically cut. No responsible study group has ever 
recommended the kinds of cutbacks that many of the elderly 
fear. Furthermore, our legislators would not enact such 
Draconian measures.
It is essential that confidence be restored. The elderly must 
be reassured and their anxiety eliminated. Young people 
have to be convinced that the program will survive so that 
they will continue to be willing to pay the taxes needed to 
support benefit payments. I strongly agree with Munnell that 
the best way to restore confidence is to enact changes that 
bring revenues and expenditures into balance for both the 
short and long term. I further submit that confidence will 
best be restored by honestly achieving financial balance 
without resorting to the sham of general revenue financing; 
it is painfully apparent there are no general revenues 
available considering the projected budgetary deficit of $150 
billion or more.
However, there are reasonable solutions available that do 
not require general revenues and that do not require that any 
current benefits be cut. The consequences of such solutions 
will not be severe if timely action is not taken.
As indicated earlier, the short term problems are the result 
of unfavorable economic conditions. High rates of 
unemployment have contributed to a reduction in expected 
revenues. However, of even greater importance is the fact 
that prices, as measured by the faulty CPI, have increased 
much more rapidly than average wages. During the three 
years 1979 through 1981, CPI indexed benefits rose by 40 
percent, whereas average wages rose by only 30 percent. 2 If 
benefits had risen by 30 percent, current benefit outlays 
would be approximately $11 billion less this year and for
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many years in the future, and short term financing problems 
would have been avoided. Moreover, intergenerational equi 
ty between workers and beneficiaries would have been 
preserved.
Presently, revenue growth depends on wage growth, while 
benefit growth depends on the CPI. Economist Henry Aaron 
of the Brookings Institution, in his testimony before the Na 
tional Commission on Social Security Reform, said that this 
results in an "unstable" situation that should be corrected. 
This "unstable" condition must be addressed if future finan 
cing problems are to be avoided.
In an August 10, 1982 article appearing in the Wall Street 
Journal, Charles Schultze, Chairman of the Council of 
Economic Advisers to President Carter, argues persuasively 
for replacement of CPI adjustment in all federal entitlement 
programs with a wage index reduced by 2 or 2.5 percent. 
This deduction exceeds the assumed future increase in real 
wage growth. Therefore, he concludes that Congress could 
periodically decide if ad hoc adjustments are warranted.
The long term financing problems are much more serious, 
particularly if the Medicare program is considered, as it 
should be. The long term problems are largely the result of 
demographics. The tidal wave of the "baby boom" genera 
tion will have to be supported by the relatively smaller "baby 
bust" generation, and the problem will be compounded by 
every increasing longevity.
There are currently 3.2 workers supporting each 
beneficiary. Even after assuming an increase in birth rates, 
this is expected to decrease to a 2 to 1 ratio once the baby 
boom generation is retired. 3 This projection is of minor con 
cern to some who point out that the total dependency ratio, 
considering both those under 20 and those over 64, will not 
change dramatically and that resources can therefore be 
shifted from support of dependent children to support of the
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elderly. While this is true in part, it must be recognized that 
the elderly receive a level of support three times as large as 
that received by children because the elderly maintain in 
dependent households. 4 This fact gains significance when 
one realizes that the percentage of U.S. population over age 
65 will exceed the proportion of the current population 
residing in Florida once the baby boom generation retires.
I am both a representative of the baby boom generation 
and a father. My children are part of the baby bust genera 
tion. Unless changes are made in the benefits that have been 
promised to my generation, my children and their employers 
will be required to pay taxes equivalent to 34 percent of 
payroll to support the wage related benefits discussed by 
Munnell and the Medicare benefits. 5 1 believe it is neither fair 
no reasonable to leave that legacy to my children.
Incidentally, this 34 percent cost estimated is based upon 
the II-B "best estimate" assumptions, which project an in 
crease in birth rates, a slowdown in the rate of mortality im 
provement, and a return to the very favorable economic con 
ditions of the 1950s and 1960s. Costs would be even higher if 
these assumptions prove to be optimistic, as has been the 
case during the last decade.
Since the long term problem is a demographic problem, it 
warrants a demographic solution. The proposal to gradually 
increase the retirement age, as Munnell suggests, is a 
reasonable solution. Most study groups have recommended 
such an increase, and a New York Times survey conducted 
last year found public support for such a change by a 5 to 4 
margin.
James Schulz correctly points out the fact that people do 
favor early retirement. Therefore, the approach being 
developed by House Ways and Means Social Security Sub 
committee Chairman Pickle that would still permit actuarial- 
ly reduced benefits to begin as early as 62 is preferable to ap-
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preaches that advance the early retirement ages as the nor 
mal age increases.
Like Schulz, I too favor the "carrot to the stick." 
However, demographic developments force our country to 
make some difficult choices. Since Social Security is an inter- 
generational transfer program, the difficult choices must be 
framed within the context of the following question: At what 
point in time can parents realistically expect that their 
children will be able to support them?
Several years ago, President Carter appointed the Presi 
dent's Commission on Pension Policy to examine all aspects 
of retirement income. This Democratic controlled Commis 
sion concluded that "the nation has become too dependent 
on pay-as-you-go programs like social security to provide 
retirement income for elder citizens." They recommended a 
long term shifting of dependency to a balanced program of 
employer sponsored pension plans, social security and in 
dividual saving. 6
The Schulz paper points out the fact that private pension 
plans can provide a very significant level of retirement in 
come for those who are covered. Munnell points out that on 
ly one-half of the workforce is covered by such plans. 
However, that statistic is misleading, since many of those 
who are not covered do not yet meet the ERISA participa 
tion standards of age 25, one year of service and 1000 hours 
of employment. Among that portion of the workforce who 
must meet these standards, more than two-thirds are 
covered. 7 Furthermore, more than 90 percent of married 
couples can expect to receive employer pension benefits 
when they retire. 8
Besides helping to assure an adequate level of retirement 
income, private pension plans offer an important advantage 
in that they offer flexibility to meet different needs and cir 
cumstances. For example, some industries, such as steel,
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have jobs that are more physically strenuous. Therefore the 
United Steel Workers of America have typically negotiated 
pension plans offering generous early retirement benefits. 
This type of flexibility is virtually impossible to achieve with 
a monolithic plan covering all Americans. It is just one of the 
reasons why the government should actively seek to en 
courage the expansion and adoption of such plans.
Both authors have noted that private pension plan benefits 
to retirees have not kept pace with inflation despite periodic 
ad hoc adjustments. I regard this as a significant problem 
that employers must address. In Canada, there is increasing 
awareness of this issue, and the employer community is 
beginning to respond by supporting an approach referred to 
as the "excess interest method." Under this method, excess 
investment return, resulting in large part from inflation, is 
used to provide additional benefits. This approach has been 
used by the Rockefeller Foundation in the U.S.
However, the best way to solve these inflation-related 
problems is by adoption of appropriate fiscal and monetary 
policy designed to control inflation. While the Federal 
Reserve has been following such a course, neither 
Republican nor Democratic politicians have had the courage 
to do so.
Finally, individual savings can provide a very significant 
source of retirement income or can reduce the need for other 
sources of income. I agree with Munnell that individuals at 
the lowest income levels are not able to save. However, I 
strongly disagree that middle income workers will not be able 
to save if proper tax incentives are provided along with con 
venient means to facilitate the saving. As evidence, it should 
be noted that 72 percent of persons over age 65 live in their 
own homes, and 84 percent of those homes are mortgage 
free. 9 Our tax policies have encouraged home ownership and 
the public has responded.
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As another example, my employer, The Prudential In 
surance Company of America, provides a thrift plan to all 
employees after one year of service. The company fully 
matches the first 3 percent of salary set aside by the 
employees. Beyond that, the employee can save up to an ad 
ditional 10 percent of salary. Since the company contribu 
tion vests very quickly, it is not surprising that 90 percent of 
the eligible employees participate in the program. Moreover, 
contrary to MunnelPs contention, two-thirds of the par 
ticipants are able to set aside additional savings, and the 
levels of savings are very significant at every income level. 
For example, the total savings rate for all participants, in 
cluding the company's 3 percent share, is 10.5 percent of 
salary. The only salary group with a savings rate less than 10 
percent are those earning less than $10,000 per year, whose 
rate was 9.7 percent.
In addition, last year's Congressional legislation permit 
ting all wage earners to establish tax-deferred IRAs was a 
major step to encourage people to save for their retirement. 
The public has responded very favorably, and our company 
alone will have established approximately one-half million 
IRAs in this first year of eligibility. This figure is especially 
impressive considering that only one-tenth of all IRAs have 
been set up through insurance companies, and that Pruden 
tial accounts for only 10 percent of the total insurance in 
dustry.
Evidence of these kinds leads me to believe that the ma 
jority of the population is capable of setting aside significant 
savings for retirement. What has been needed are the proper 
incentives and the means to set aside such savings. National 
policy should continue and expand efforts to develop such 
arrangements.
In conclusion, Social Security is the essential base for pro 
viding retirement income, and steps should be taken to
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restore public confidence in the program. Those steps should 
honestly restore financial balance for both the short and long 
term so that it will continue to serve its vital role not only for 
this generation but for future generations as well. Private 
pension plans and individual savings can and should play a 
major role in providing retirement income. Those plans offer 
flexibility needed to meet different needs and circumstances. 
In addition, those plans avoid the potential for inter- 
generational conflicts inherent in pay-as-you-go financed 
programs. Thus, there is need for legislation and regulation 
designed to encourage rather than discourage these sources 
of income. Retirement income can best be provided by a 
balanced program of Social Security, private pension plans 
and individual savings. Such a balanced program will assure 
adequate and secure sources of retirement income for all 
Americans.
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Chapters 8 & 9 
Discussion
Michael K. Taussig
Alicia Munnell and James Schulz have produced two 
stimulating papers on various aspects of social pension 
policy. MunnelFs paper gives an excellent, clear presentation 
of the main issues in social security financing. Schulz's paper 
is harder to describe; its title is somewhat misleading because 
he has as much to say about social security as about private 
pensions. His discussion of both these subjects includes a 
number of important, provocative points about pension 
policy issues. On the whole, the two papers complement each 
other well.
Munnell and Schulz do clash sharply on one crucial fac 
tual matter. Schulz argues that the available evidence shows 
that improvements in longevity have not been matched by 
similar improvements in the health of the aged. Munnell 
comes to the opposite conclusion. Pension policy decisions 
depend critically on who is right. We expect that continued 
improvements in medical care and technology will in the 
absence of nuclear war or some other catastrophe of com 
parable magnitude cause a large increase in the number of 
persons who survive until, and well past, the traditional 
retirement ages in this country. We do not yet know, 
however, whether the expected increase in longevity will 
cause a corresponding increase in the number of dependent 
aged persons. If the aged worker of tomorrow is healthier 
than her or his counterpart today, and if there are sufficient 
attractive job opportunities, then increased longevity will not 
necessarily mean increased dependency. Unfortunately, I am
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not an expert on this complex subject and I cannot resolve 
the disagreement between the authors of the two papers. The 
fact that two such eminent authorities on social pension 
policy disagree about the weight of the available evidence 
suggests to me that this is a high priority area for more 
research.
Instead of dwelling further on the details of the papers, I 
will now briefly sketch my own perspectives on some of the 
issues in social pension policy. The basic features of social 
security financing in the United States today are remarkably 
simple. The system is financed almost entirely by a payroll 
tax levied on the wages and salaries of current workers. If 
payroll tax revenues into OASDI are not sufficient to pay the 
benefits payable under existing formulas to retired and 
disabled workers and to their dependents and survivors, then 
either more revenues have to be found or benefits have to be 
cut, or some combination of both. None of the options to 
day for solving the short-run financing problems of the 
system is painless. However, the magnitude of the problem is 
too often exaggerated. As Munnell shows, the current short 
falls in OASDI revenue are small relative to the size of ex 
isting benefit commitments and are not expected to persist 
for more than the next half dozen years or so.
In my view, solving the short-run financing problems of 
social security by cutting benefits is wrong because it means 
breaking government commitments to dependent retired and 
disabled persons who are, for the most part, helpless in cop 
ing with large, unexpected cuts in their incomes. Any payroll 
tax increase would be preferable because it would spread the 
pain of reductions in living standards much more widely and 
fairly. My own preferred solution to the short-run financing 
problem of the OASDI system is to extend coverage im 
mediately to all federal government employees. This step is 
long overdue on the basis of fairness to virtually all other
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workers. It is my experience that people become instant 
cynics about the federal government and about social securi 
ty in particular when they learn that the Congress chooses to 
exclude itself and social security bureaucrats from the "pro 
tection" of the social security programs they legislate and 
administer for almost all the rest of the population. The ex 
tension of coverage to federal government employees would 
end this scandal and would most conveniently solve com 
pletely all financing problems for social security until well in 
to the next century.
As Munnell explains, the long-run financing problems of 
social security around the year 2014 and for some time 
thereafter are largely due to the aging of the baby boom 
cohorts and the expected continuation of the very low fertili 
ty of the 1960s and 1970s. I find it impossible to share the 
prevalent concern about this distant crisis because I believe 
there is little we can do now to affect the situation some 30 or 
40 years in the future. We could, of course, sharply increase 
payroll tax rates in order to build up substantial OASDI trust 
funds. Economists throw cold water on this idea by observ 
ing that such a measure would help only if it caused a 
substantial increase in real capital formation and a higher 
rate of national economic growth. Even if it were guaranteed 
to work, I doubt that it would be acceptable to current 
workers. They would in effect have to pay for their own 
retirement benefits as well as for the benefits of current 
retirees. Alternatively, we could be more conservative about 
the level of benefits promised to current workers. As Mun 
nell explains, one way this could be done is to switch from 
the current system of wage indexing of covered earnings to 
price indexing. Such a step would reduce the replacement 
rate under OASDI if real wages increase in the future. It 
should be obvious that this change would also be most unat 
tractive to current workers looking ahead to retirement in the 
next century. If such measures are rejected, then the social
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security financing problems of 2020 will have to be solved in 
2020.
These thoughts lead me to question what Munnell calls the 
"individual lifetime perspective" as the rationale for a social 
security disability and retirement system. Both it and the an 
nual tax and transfer perspective are valid in specific cir 
cumstances, but I lean more to the tax-transfer view. Every 
generation has to make a decision about the size and 
distribution of the net transfer from its current workers to its 
dependent nonworkers. We can try now to influence this 
transfer in the year 2020 by promising our young workers the 
present replacement rates in OASDI, but any such promise 
has to be fulfilled by the workers then alive. If we make pro 
mises now that the workers of 2020 refuse to honor, they will 
have ample means to cut drastically the size of the transfer. 
Thus, all the lifetime insurance aspects of social security 
could be swept away if any generation refuses to repay the 
compulsory savings of its retired and disabled workers.
Even if we could do something now to avert the expected 
long-run deficits of OASDI, it is not obvious to me that we 
should do anything. First, babies may come back into 
fashion in the 1980s and 1990s and grow up just in time to 
work and pay taxes to alleviate the expected social security 
financial problems. Second, as both Munnell and Schulz say, 
the opportunities for work are likely to be more attractive 
for older workers in 2020 than today. If continued work 
becomes attractive enough, both financially and otherwise, 
then the burden of dependency to be borne by social security 
could turn out to be far less than we project today. Third, if 
tight labor markets do exist in 2020 and if older workers are 
not interested in taking the available jobs, then allowing 
more immigration of young workers might be an attractive 
policy on many grounds. For one thing, the young im 
migrants could help pay for the social security benefits pro 
mised to the retired and disabled. Such optimistic scenarios
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are not to be confused with scientific predictions, of course, 
but in my opinion, they are on the same footing as the pro 
jections of the OASDI actuaries. I derive great amusement 
from the spectacle of intelligent and well-informed people 
who take the official social security actuarial projections so 
seriously despite the fact that these projections have turned 
out to be dead wrong time after time. It would be an in 
teresting exercise to trace the history of the social security ac 
tuarial projections for fertility, mortality, wages, prices and 
labor force participation against what actually occurred. 
Finally, as Munnell shows, even if we accept the pessimistic 
official projections for 2020 and beyond, the tax rates re 
quired of the relatively rich workers with few dependent 
children at that time are not out of line with the social securi 
ty tax rates paid now by workers in other industrialized, 
democratic countries.
I will conclude my discussion of the two papers with a 
mention of important aspects of social pension policy that 
neither author addressed. The elderly have important 
sources of income other than earnings or OASDI and private 
pensions. Supplementary security income is an important 
source of income support for the poor and near-poor elderly. 
Also, many elderly persons still depend on support from 
their children, sometimes as members of extended families 
living in the same household. On the other end of the income 
spectrum, a small number of elderly persons finance their 
retirement largely out of accumulated personal saving. If the 
new rules affecting individual retirement accounts are effec 
tive, private savings will become a more important and 
widespread source of retirement income by 2020.1 believe it 
is important to examine the possible growth of these alter 
native income sources for the elderly in assessing the suffi 
ciency of pensions in the next century.
A related point is that both papers concentrate too much 
on the replacement rates provided by public and private pen-
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sions as a criterion for the sufficiency of such benefits. The 
focus of some recent research has been on direct measure 
ment of the total incomes of the elderly relative to the 
nonelderly. In some recent work of this kind, Sheldon Dan- 
ziger, Jacques van der Gaag, Eugene Smolensky, and I have 
found that the elderly fare surprisingly well relative to the 
nonelderly when all relevant factors, such as the number of 
persons sharing the household income, are taken into ac 
count as much as current data allow. One of our findings of 
particular interest for this conference is that the elderly fare 
particularly well relative to the nonelderly at the same level 
of pretransfer income. Compared to the elderly, some other 
groups, such as children in one-parent families, are much 
worse off and are much less protected by our system of 
transfers.
